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The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the 
Putative Father's Parental Rights 
I. lNTRODUGUON: 
A SURVEY OF STATE LA Ws CURTAILING 
THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The constitutionality of the legal disabilities that the states inflict 
upon the illegitimate child has been the subject of recent discussion 
both in the legal literature1 and in the cases.2 However, the constitu-
tionality of similar discriminations against the father of an illegiti-
mate child is only beginning to gain the same attention.3 State laws 
currently treat the putative father4 less favorably than other parents 
with respect to privileges of parenthood such as custody of the child, 
visitation rights, and an opportunity to be heard at adoption pro-
ceedings. 6 
1. E.g., Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisi-
ana and G/ona v. American Guarantee b Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. I 
(1969); Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967); 
Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on 
Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 338 (1969). 
2. Weber v. Aetna Cas, & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); cases in Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 613 
(1971). 
3. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), revg. In re Stanley, 45 ID. 2d 132, 256 
N.E.2d 814 (1970); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating 
and remanding State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 
N.W .2d 56 (1970); Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 
11 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1971); Note, Rights of a Putative Father in Relation to His Illegiti-
mate Child: A Question of Equal Protection, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 770 (1971); Note, 
Domestic Relations-Putative Father's Right to Custody of His Child, 1971 WIS, L. 
REv. 1262. 
4. Throughout this Comment the term "putative father" refers to the father of an 
illegitimate child. It will be assumed that the identity of the putative father is known. 
This assumption is not entirely realistic, but it is probably true in a majority of cases. 
See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK & B. EVANS, THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW APPROACHES FOR 
HELPING UNMARRIED YouNG PARENTS 44, 85 (1971). The problem of identity is essentially 
one of evidence. See Burnett v. Camden, 253 Ind. 354, 359-60, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202, 
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 901 (1970); In re Crawford, 64 Misc. 2d 758, 763, 315 N.Y .S.2d 
890, 896 (Sur. Ct. 1970). Cf. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 
(1968). For a discussion of the limitations a state may place on proof of paternity, see 
note 49 infra. 
5. In almost every state, the father of an illegitimate child has some sort of support 
obligation. This obligation, although perhaps burdensome, is not here considered to 
be a discrimination against the father. Actually, these obligations make the father's 
duties more equal to those of legitimate parents. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAw OF 
Do:r,msnc RELATIONS § 5.3 (1968). The Supreme Court has recently granted review in 
two cases raising the issue whether the equal protection clause mandates that states 
require putative fathers to support their children because other parents must do so. 
S. v. D., 335 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. postponed, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972); 
L - G - v. F - 0. P - , 466 S.W .2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), prob. juris. noted sub 
nom. Gomez v. Perez, 40 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. June 26, 1972). See also R - v. R - , 
431 S.W .2d 152 (Mo. 1968); Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968). 
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A brief survey of these state laws illustrates the nature and scope 
of discrimination against the putative father.6 In the case of the 
legitimate child, if the parents should separate, each parent generally 
has an equal right to custody.7 However, the father of an illegitimate 
child has no such equality with the child's mother. If the mother 
of an illegitimate child is a fit parent, she is given custody.8 This 
automatic preference for the mother has been applied even when 
it is far from clear that granting the mother custody will best serve 
the child's welfare.9 If the mother is dead or unfit, several states give 
custody of the child to a putative father who is a fit parent;10 but 
6. The laws discriminating against the putative father often will not apply if there 
has been a formal procedure to legitimate the child born out of wedlock. There is a 
wide variation among the various state legitimation laws, but a brief summary will be 
attempted here. Some states still allow the old common law marriage as a form of 
legitimation, See Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 S, 885 (1915); Umbenhower v. Labus, 
85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912). Commonly, subsequent intermarriage of the parents 
will legitimate the children, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 10 (1958); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. 
§ 45-274 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.091 (1964), although often recognition or acknowl• 
edgment by the father that the child is his is necessary, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN, § 61-
14l(b) (1971); ILL. REv. STAT, ch. 3, § 12 (1971); KAN. STAT, ANN. § 23-126 (Supp, 1971), 
Several states provide for legitimation by acknowledgment or some form of writing, 
e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 11 (Supp. 1969); CAL, PROB, CODE§ 255 (West 1956); DEL, CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (1964); MICH, COMP, LAws ANN. 
§ 702.83 (1968). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1964). A few states provide for complete 
legitimation if the father receives the child into his home {if he is married, his wife 
must consent). E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 (West 1954); UTAH CODE ANN, 78-30-12 (1953). 
Finally, Arizona, North Dakota, and Oregon consider all children to be legitimate. 
Aruz. REv. STAT. § 14-206 (1956); ORE. REv, STAT, § 109.060 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 56-01-05 (1971). Cf. Ar.As. STAT. § 25.20.050 (1962) (providing for legitimacy if 
paternity is ascertained}, The problem under these statutes is to establish the legal 
relationship between father and child by evidentiary means, See Aruz. REv. STAT. 
§ 12-621 (1956), § 12-843 (Supp. 1971); ORE, REv. STAT. § 109.070 (1971). This is only a 
brief sketch of the various statutes. For a more complete discussion and more au• 
thorities, see H. KRAUSE, lLLEGmMACY! LAW AND SOCIAL POUCY 10-21, 297-306 (1971): 
H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 5.2; Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 84-88 (1959); 
Annot., 33 A.LR.2d 705 (1954). 
Legitimation statutes will be largely ignored in this Comment since these statutes 
are often too narrow in their formalistic requirements to legitimate many children. 
See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 5.2, at 159. Also, many of these statutes only legitimate 
the child for the purpose of intestate succession. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 255 (West 1956); 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 153-2-8 (1964); CoNN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-274 (1960); IND, STAT. 
ANN. § 6-207 (Burns 1953); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1971). 
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-106 (1964); N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw § 70 (McKinney 
1964). Courts and statutes sometimes speak of favoring the mother in the case of chil• 
dren of tender years, but this is done only if all other factors are equal, Sec CAL, C1v, 
CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1972): Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir, 1945): Adams 
v. Adams, 206 Ga. 881, 59 S.E.2d 366 (1950). 
8. E.g., CAL. C1v. CODE § 200 (West 1954); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 45--43 (Supp. 
1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-5 (1971); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05 (1971): ORE. REv. STAT. § 109-080 (1971); Wis. STAT, ANN. 
§ 48.13 (1957), § 48.02 (Supp. 1972); Blakemore v. Blakemore, 217 Ga, 174, 121 S.E,2d 642 
(1961); In re McGraw, 228 N.C. 46, 44 S.E.2d 349 (1947). But see Godinez v. Russo, 49 
Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Family Ct. 1966). 
9. See Roe v. Doe, 58 Misc. 2d 757, 296 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Family Ct. 1968); Jolly v. 
Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Gilford v. Miller, 
213 Pa. Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968), 
lO. Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Guardianship 
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even under these circumstances, some states still deny custody to 
the putative father.11 Thus, the putative father's right to custody is 
sharply circumscribed. 
A parent who does not have custody of the child may desire visita-
tion privileges. Usually this is not a problem for the separated parents 
of legitimate children.12 There are few reported cases concerning the 
efforts of the putative father to gain visitation rights, perhaps because 
few putative fathers desire to visit their illegitimate children or 
because the issue arises only if the mother refuses to allow the visits. 
Most courts that have considered the matter grant visitation priv-
ileges to the putative father if a close familial relationship has 
existed between father and child.13 One court has even ordered 
visitation when there had been no previous social relationship be-
tween the father and his one-year-old child.14 Only the Illinois courts 
have refused under any circumstances to enforce visitation privileges 
for the putative father.rn In regard to visitation rights, at least, the 
putative father has gained a measure of legal equality with other 
parents. 
Adoption terminates the existing legal relationship between par-
ents and child and substitutes a new legal relationship with a 
different set of parents.16 In normal circumstances, both parents of a 
legitimate child must consent to their child's adoption, while only 
the mother's consent is a prerequisite to the adoption of an illegiti-
of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P .2d 888 (1954); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 
N.W .2d 27 (1967); In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W .2d 449 (1962); Torres v. Gon-
zales, 80 N.M. 35, 450 P.2d 921 (1969); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d 
290 (Sup. Ct. 1957); State in the Interest of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P .2d 1013 (1970). 
Some courts even talk of the father's prior right to custody in this situation. Caruso v. 
Superior Court, 100 Ariz. at 173, 412 P.2d at 467; In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 
· 2d at 92-93, 265 P.2d at 889 (plurality opinion); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d at 203, 
165 N.Y.S.2d at 291-92. 
11. In re Adoption of A., 226 A.2d 823 (Del. 1967); Hall v. Hall, 222 Ga. 820, 152 
S.E.2d 737 (1966); In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), reud. sub nom. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
12. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.4, at 590. 
13. Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 S.2d 195 (1956) (child legitimated); Strong v. 
Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336,205 P.2d 48 (1949) (child legitimated); Mixon v. Mize, 198 
S.2d 373 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 204 S.2d 211 (Fla. 1967); Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 
135, 85 A. 816 (1913); People ex rel. "Francois" v. "lvanova", 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961); Cornell v. Hartley, 54 Misc. 2d '132, 283 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Family Ct. 
1967); In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Ex parte 
Hendrix, 186 Okla. '112, 100 P.2d 444 (1940) (child legitimated); Commonwealth v. 
Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965), overruUng Commonwealth ex rel. 
Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965). See generally Recent 
Development, A Father's Right To Visit His Illegitimate Child, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 738 
(1966). 
14. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Family Ct. 1968). 
15. DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill. 2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 465 (1966); Wallace v. Wal-
lace, 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (1965). 
16. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-17 (1971); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-15-14 
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-10, 78-30-11 (1953). See generally H. Cr.ARK, supra 
note 5, § 18.9 
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mate child.17 The putative father is usually completely ignored in 
adoption proceedings;18 neither his consent10 nor notice to him of 
the pending adoption20 is necessary. If the father learns of the adop-
tion proceedings and attempts to intervene, some courts allow him 
to do so and, in appropriate cases, to gain custody of the child.21 
However, this is a minor exception to the generally valid proposition 
that the putative father plays no role in adoption. It remains possible 
for a concerned putative father to lose his parental rights simply 
because he is unaware of the pending adoption.22 
The number of children and fathers affected by laws disfavoring 
the putative father is by no means insignificant. In 1968 alone there 
were approximately 339,200 illegitimate births.23 In 1969 approxi-
mately 109,000 children who had been born out of wedlock were 
adopted, representing almost ninety per cent of all adoptions by non-
relatives of the child.24 As late as the fall of 1971 it appeared that 
no change in this area of family law would be mandated by any doc-
trine. However, recent cases and the proposed constitutional amend-
ment requiring that equality of rights not be denied on grounds of 
sex25 may portend impending change. This Comment will first 
examine whether the equal protection or due process clauses of the 
17. E.g., Cu.. CIV. CODE§ 224 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. DOM, REL. LA'\V § 111 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971). The only exceptions to this general rule are when a parent is 
somehow unfit or when a divorced parent of a legitimate child docs not have custody. 
See Katz, Judidal and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEo, L.J. 64, 77-85 
(1962). 
18. See H. KRAusE, supra note 6, at 32. 
19. E.g., Cu.. CIV. CoDE § 224 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT, ANN. § 59-2102 (Supp. 
1971); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.D. Cmr. CoDE § 14-15-05 
(1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.080 (1971). See also Parsons v. Stout, 76 Wash. 2d 487, 
457 P .2d 544 (1969). 
Some states require the father's consent if his parenthood has been adjudged in a 
paternity proceeding, e.g., .ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN, § 56--106 (1971). 
20. AI.As. STAT. § 20.10.040 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT. ANN. § !l-120 (Burns Supp. 1970) 
(court can order notice in its discretion); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 109.080 (1971); N.D. Cmr, 
CODE § 14-15-06 (1971); WIS. STAT, .ANN. § 48.88 (Supp. 1971), Many statutes do not 
make this explicit, but since no consent is required, the courts probably will not require 
notice. See In re Adoption of A., 226 A.2d 823, 824 (Del. 1967), interpreting DEL, CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1953). 
21. Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Brennan, 270 
Minn. 455, 134 N.W .2d 126 (1965); In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1968), 
decided on the merits, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W .2d 795 (1964); State in Interest of M,, 25 
Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
22. See In re Sarkissian, 215 Cal. App. 2d 554, 30 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1968); Jambrone 
v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569 (1959); Thomas v. Children's Aid Sodety, 12 
Utah 2d 235,364 P.2d 1029 (1961). But see In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 
27 (1967). 
23. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1971). 
24. NATIONAL CENTER FOi\ SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. HEALnt, EDUCATION, AND 
WELFA_RE, ADOPTIONS IN 1969, at 1-2 (1969). 
25. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8-9, 92d Cong,, 1st Sess. 
(1971). These resolutions are identical; later citations will be to the House resolution 
alone. 
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Constitution presently proscribe disparate treatment of the putative 
father, as compared with other parents, in regard to parental privi-
leges. Attention will then be given to an assessment of the potential 
impact of the proposed "equal rights" amendment on the putative 
father's rights in relation to his illegitimate child. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION 
A. Review Under the Traditional Equal 
Protection Standard 
The equal protection clause does not require that a state treat 
all persons, no matter how situated, alike. It is necessary that laws 
classify persons into different groups for a variety of purposes. Under 
the traditional equal protection standard, only a permissible purpose 
and a classification rationally related to that purpose are required.26 . 
Although there are some indications to the contrary, 27 classifications 
are generally set aside only if "no grounds can be conceived to justify 
them."28 
The Court normally does not require that the classification per-
fectly separate those who are targets of the statute's purpose from 
those who are not.29 When the standard of review is the existence 
of a rational relation, the Court has said that classifications need 
not be "mathematically precise,"30 and has upheld some classifica-
tions that on their face appear rather arbitrary.31 
While the legislative purposes of state laws that single out putative 
fathers for differential treatment are not clear, at least tw-o primary 
26. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See generally 
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065, 1077-87 (1969). 
The Court is not likely to attribute an impermissible purpose to the state. See, e.g., 
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
27. Some cases in which the rational basis test was allegedly applied seem in fact 
to have employed a stricter standard of review. This conclusion depends more on the 
reader's comparison of the cases than on any language used by the Court. Compare 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), with Richardson v. Belcher, 404 u.s: 78 (1971); 
and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), with Labine v. 
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
28. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). 
29. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970). 
30. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
31. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (offset in Social Security disability 
payments if worker receives workmen's compensation payments but not if he receives 
private insurance payments); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (maximum 
limit on welfare payments no matter how large the family and its needs and regardless 
of the parents' inability to work); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949) (owner of truck could post on it advertising for his own business but not for 
another's business); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (only women who were 
wives or daughters of male bar owners could work as bartenders); Kotch v. Board 
of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (jobs as riverboat pilots given only to 
relatives and friends of current pilots). 
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purposes can reasonably be attributed to such laws.32 The first is to 
punish the putative father for his "sins" in order to deter promiscuity 
and illegitimacy and to encourage marriage and the preservation of 
the legitimate family unit.33 A second purpose, and surely what 
ought to be the controlling consideration, is to further the welfare 
of the illegitimate child.34 Legislatures and courts might believe that 
the putative father is generally not likely to have an actual social 
relationship with his child and is not likely to be a fit parent. 
Statutory discriminations against putative fathers do not in every 
case accomplish the purposes that they are ostensibly designed to 
advance. Whether the denial of parental privileges deters promis-
cuity and illegitimacy is particularly doubtful. The Supreme Court 
has flatly rejected the contention that the denial of recovery to a 
mother for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child would deter 
illegitimacy.35 The purpose of discouraging promiscuity and illegiti-
macy is perhaps less farfetched in the context of laws affecting par-
ental privileges such as custody, since parents are more likely to have 
children in order to enjoy their custody than to collect damages for 
their wrongful death. But the state has denigrated this purpose by 
refusing to apply the sanctions curtailing parental privileges to 
mothers of illegitimate children.86 In addition, even if both the 
mother and the father of an illegitimate child were denied parental 
privileges, it would appear questionable whether such sanctions 
could counteract the complex social and psychological forces that 
foster illegitimacy and promiscuity.37 Finally, it is submitted that the 
purpose of deterring promiscuity should be disregarded if its further-
ance by means of depriving parents of custody would conflict with 
what should be the controlling purpose-promoting the child's wel-
fare. Certainly, this is the case whenever a fit parent is separated from 
or denied custody of his illegitimate child. 
Nevertheless, a court that is merely looking for a rational relation 
between the classification and its purpose would be likely to uphold 
laws that discriminate against the putative father. Broad generaliza-
tions concerning the illegitimate child's welfare support classifications 
limiting the custody, visitation, and adoption interests of the putative 
father. A rational legislature could believe that usually the illegiti-
mate child's welfare will be furthered by living with the mother 
32. For a discussion on attributing purposes to laws, see Developments in the Law, 
supra note 26, at 1077-81. 
33. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 6, at 73-78. 
34. See !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-2, 701-14, 702-5 (1971). 
35. Glona v. American Guar. &: Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). See text 
accompanying notes 86-90 infra. 
36. See notes 6-22 supra and accompanying text. 
37. See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 147-55; H. KRAUSE, 
supra note 6, at 257-67. 
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rather than with the father.38 Those states that deny the putative 
father any right to custody, even when the mother is dead or unfit,89 
may rationally believe that the interests of the child will be best 
served by his living with other relatives or guardians.40 The putative 
father may generally be less fit as a guardian than others. Even Illi-
nois, the only state that completely denies the father visitation priv-
ileges,41 is not necessarily irrational in assuming that the putative 
father's visits may harm the child. For example, the visits might well 
impress upon the child a stigma of illegitimacy or embarrass both 
mother and child by advertising the child's illegitimacy to the neigh-
bors.42 Finally, the current exclusion of the putative father from 
adoption proceedings48 is justifiable if one assumes that adoption, 
with the mother's consent, usually advances the child's interest. This 
assumption appears rational since adoptive parents are carefully 
screened and presumably the child will be better off with two such 
parents than with his natural father.44 
Thus, current state laws have a conceivable basis supporting them 
and would pass the rational relation test. This conclusion is con-
firmed by two recent state decisions that upheld under this test classi-
fications that discriminated against the putative father.46 
B. Review Under the Compelling Interest Test: 
The Search for a Fundamental Interest or 
Suspect Classification 
I. The Validity of Current Classifications Under 
Strict Review 
Although classifications that affect the rights of putative fathers 
would be upheld under the rational relation test, in certain instances 
the Court will abandon its laissez-faire attitude and will uphold a 
38. Cf, J. BOWLBY, CHlLD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LoVE 15 (2d ed. 1965). 
39. See cases cited in note 11 supra. 
40. See In re Stanley, 45 m. 2d Hl2, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970), revd. sub nom. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
41. See cases cited in note 15 supra. 
42. See People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova," 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 318-23, 221 
N.Y.S.2d 75, 77-81 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. 
Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965), overruled by Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 
206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965). 
43. See authorities cited in notes 18-22 supra. 
44. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 431-34, 178 
N.W .2d 56, 61-63 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social 
Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). 
45. In re Stanley, 45 m. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), revd. sub nom. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 
420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social 
Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). For a discussion of Stanley, see text accompanying notes 
132-57 infra. 
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classification only if it is justified by a compelling state interest.40 
Under this standard of review, the Court will indeed demand that 
the classification further the state's interest with mathematical preci-
sion.47 Thus, the choice of the applicable standard of review will usu-
ally determine the outcome of a case.48 Almost every classification can 
ineet the rational relation test; few can withstand the strict scrutiny 
of the compelling state interest standard. 
It is unlikely that the laws curtailing the parental rights of puta-
tive fathers could withstand such strict scrutiny. The assertion that 
these laws deter promiscuity and illegitimacy, thereby protecting the 
integrity of the legitimate family unit, would fail since mathematical 
precision would require that the same sanctions be applied against 
the mother as are now imposed against the putative father. Similarly, 
the purpose of promoting the child's welfare does not justify auto-
matically disfavoring all putative fathers.40 
Certainly, the welfare of the child must be considered a com• 
pelling interest.50 But however true it may generally be that the 
mother should be awarded custody in order to further this interest, 
there are situations in which the father can provide a better environ• 
ment for the child's development than the mother. Resolving the 
controversy over whose custody will further the best interest of 
the child is complex, and no rule of thumb is adequate in every 
case. 61 Since in custody proceedings the parties are already in court, 
it should not be difficult for the court to consider evidence regarding 
what each parent has to offer the child. 52 This might expend more 
46. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
47. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), 
48. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970), 
49. Some states grant known fathers of illegitimate children full equality of parental 
rights with the mother, but only if they prove their identity and legitimate the child 
in accordance with a specified procedure. See, e.g., CAL, C1v. CooE § 230 (West 1954), 
Such statutes may also fail to survive strict scrutiny, for their imprecise classifications 
still ignore the individual fact situation. The identity of the father and his concern 
for the child may be clear, and yet, for one reason or another, he may not have 
legitimated the child in the only permissible way. There appears to be no compelling 
reason for precluding all putative fathers from presenting evidence concerning their 
paternity if the issue has not been foreclosed in previous litigation, The states may 
provide simple means of legitimation, but should not make them tl1e exclusive 
prerequisite for recognition of the putative father's rights. ' 
50. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
However, some states have adopted the so-called "parental right" theory to resolve 
disputes between a natural parent and an outsider. Under this theory the parent is to 
be preferred, unless shown to be unfit; and the cltild's best interest, as such, is not an 
issue. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.5, at 591-93; Note, Alternatives to "Parental 
Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 152-56 
(1963). Arguably, those states that take this approach cannot contend that the cltlld's 
interest is to them a compelling state interest for they decline to regard it as compelling 
in every case. 
51. See Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following 
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L, REv. 55, 67-74 (1969); Note, supra note 50, at 166-67. 
52. Such court hearings do not guarantee that the evidence will be of high quality 
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court time, but the saving of court time is certainly not a compelling 
state interest.53 Similarly, in custody controversies between the father 
and third parties the best interest of the child in the individual case 
can and should be determined. 
The same solution is required for any disputes concerning visita-
tion rights: laws will not withstand strict scrutiny unless they decide 
the issue of the child's welfare in the individual case. While it is 
possible that the putative father's visits will harm the child,54 they 
might instill in the child a sense of his father's love. The father may 
be able to develop desirable qualities in the child that the mother 
cannot. He may also be able to ensure that his support money is 
being spent wisely and to investigate whether the mother is fulfilling 
her parental duties. 55 
These results do not necessarily mean that there would be large 
numbers of putative fathers gaining custody of their children or 
even rights to visit their children. Probably most fathers, even if 
interested in their child, would be content to leave the child in the 
mother's custody; and in custody suits between parents, it seems 
likely that the mother will usually prevail. Although the putative 
father may be more interested in his offspring than is commonly 
thought, 56 the fact remains, especially for young children, that the 
mother-child relationship is very special in our society.57 Courts 
might decide in many cases that visitation would do everyone con-
cerned more harm than good. The constitutional objection to 
custody and visitation laws automatically disfavoring the putative 
father is not that they are grounded on generally invalid justifica-
tions, but rather that they fail to take into account particular cases 
and individual characteristics. The child's welfare is best promoted by 
laws that allow at least a consideration of what impact either custody 
of or visitation by the putative father will have on the child. 
The current laws that fail to give the putative father notice of a 
pending adoption and fail to require his consent likewise are not 
mathematically precise: The consent of the mother of an illegitimate 
child has been required in situations when adoption would further 
the child's welfare;58 and the putative father's consent has not been 
required when adoption may have harmed the child by separating 
or the court competent to decide the custody issue; but this is a problem for family-law 
reform, not constitutional law. See generally Watson, supra note 51, at 57-64. 
53. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
54. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
55. See Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965); Recent 
Development, supra note 13. 
56. See R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 85. 
57. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 38, at 15. 
58. In re Mathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W .2d .878 (1963); Harvey Adoption Case, 
375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953). 
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him from a fit parent.59 This impression of classification would 
normally be enough to invalidate the classifications under the com-
pelling state interest test. Consent laws affecting adoption can be 
more precisely formulated to protect the welfare of the child by 
means less restrictive of the putative father's interest. Requiring his 
consent will not necessarily harm the child. It need not delay adop-
tion proceedings to the child's detriment, for some delay is already 
built into these proceedings. 00 While consultations that decide the 
child's future have typically involved only the mother, successful 
efforts have been made to include the father.61 Thus, little incon-
venience would result if he too must acquiesce in the adoption deci-
sion. 
Given a general consent requirement, an adoption that might 
further the child's interests could still be completed if the putative 
father could not be found or refused to give his consent. Certainly, 
as a matter of due process the father's rights to his child could be 
terminated at a hearing even though he was not present if a reason-
able effort had been made to find him.62 Moreover, even now the 
mother's consent is not required in all circumstances.68 One very 
common substantive ground for dispensing with consent is abandon-
ment;64 surely, if a father neglects to support or even to visit his 
child, his inaction must be considered abandonment. 60 Should the 
father refuse to consent to an adoption that would be in the child's 
59. In re Sarkissian, 215 Cal. App. 2d 554, 30 Cal. Rptr. ll87 (1963); Jambrone v. 
David, 16 Ill 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569 (1959). See also In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 
154 N.W .2d 27 (1967). 
60. Procedures such as hearings, agency investigations, and placement invariably 
take time. Also, there is often a six-month delay between interlocutory and final 
decrees. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 18.ll; C. &: H. Doss, IF You AnoPT A CHILD 102·25, 
147-58 (1957); Katz, supra note 17, at 91-94. 
61. R. PANNOR, F. MAssARIK &: B. EVANS, supra note 4, at 85-92. This book is the 
result of the study of the efforts of one social agency randomly to include the putative 
father in decisions concerning the child's future. The researchers found that in most 
cases the mother will name the father and that the father will respond to the agency's 
invitation to discuss the situation. Id. at 44. This sharing of responsibility by the father 
actually proved to help the mother psychologically. Id. at 92. 
The leading chain of maternal-care homes-the Florence Crittenton Assodation-
has now begun to counsel the putative father as part of its program for the unwed 
mother. NEWSWEEK, March 27, 1972, at 100. 
62. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. ll06, 314-15 (1950). 
A similar situation arises if the mother refuses to or cannot name the father, although 
there is some indication that ths is rare. See R. PANNOR, F. l\!ASSARIK &: B. EVANS, supra 
note 4, at 44. 
63. H. Cr.ARK, supra note 5, § 18.5; Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under 
Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parents, 39 U. DET, L.J. 
ll47, 362-69 (1962). 
64. E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); CAL. C1v. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1972); 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (1971); N.Y. DoM. REL. I.Aw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 
1971). 
65. Cf. Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952); In Te Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 
429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 1'76 N.Y.S.2d 281 {1958). 
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best interest, his rights could be terminated if the adoption statute 
provided that a consent requirement may be waived when such 
waiver is in the child's best interest. Indeed, some states already have 
statutes of this sort.66 This procedure would further the child's wel-
fare and effect a lesser infringement upon the putative father's 
interests than current laws. A possible failure to gain the father's 
consent is no reason to require only the mother's. Under the com-
pelling state interest test, the states must use "less drastic means"67 
to further the child's interests. 
It is unlikely that requiring the putative father's consent would 
deter prospective adoptive parents and cause children to go un-
adopted. An additional consent requirement would add merely a 
small increment to the large amount of red tape adoptive parents 
already face. Also, it might be noted that those states that allow the 
mother to revoke her consent and regain custody after the child has 
been placed in an adoptive home68 can scarely argue that they are 
encouraging adoption. No compelling reason seems to exist for de-
clining to require generally the father's consent.69 
Thus, although the laws curtailing the parental privileges of the 
putative father are rationally related to the state's objectives, they 
are not able to withstand review under the more demanding equal 
protection standard. The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether these 
laws are indeed subject to review under the compelling state interest 
standard. Before that standard can be utilized, a classification must 
either affect a "fundamental interest," such as voting;r0 or be based 
upon a "suspect classification," such as race.71 
The state laws that govern the putative father's parental rights 
classify parents by two methods. The first is by the legitimacy of the 
child: the father of an illegitimate child has fewer parental rights 
than the father of a legitimate child.72 The second is by sex: the 
66. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-06 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CoDE § 16-304 (1967); MD. 
COJ>E ANN. art. 16, § 74 (Supp. 1971); VA. CollE § 6.3.1-225 (Supp. 1972). Of course, a 
court must enforce these provisions in order for them to be effective. See Simpson, supra 
note 63, at 380-81. 
67. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
637 (1969). 
68. For one rather well-publicized example of this, see People ex rel. Scarpetta v. 
Spence-Chapin AdoptioJ:1. Serv., 28 N,Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, appeal 
dismissed sub nom. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971). See generally Katz, 
supra note 17, at 87-91. 
69. Conceivably, a state could avoid the equal protection problem by not requiring 
any parents' consent prior to adoption since all parents would be treated equally. But 
cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But if such a law impinged too greatly on 
parental rights, due process might be violated. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
70. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, .377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
71. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, .379 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1964). 
72. In the subsequent disrussion, any distinction between the classifications that 
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father of an illegitimate child has fewer rights than the mother of 
the same child. In addition, these laws infringe upon the relation-
ship between the putative father and his illegitimate child. There-
fore, the compelling interest test might be invoked-with a resulting 
invalidation of the laws discriminating against the putative father-
if illegitimacy or sex are "suspect classifications," or if the putative 
father's interest in a relationship with his illegitimate child is 
"fundamental." 
2. The Rise and Fall of Illegitimacy as a 
Suspect Classification, and the Unlikely 
Possibility That the Putative Father's 
Interest in His Child Is Fundamental 
Recently, Levy v. Louisiana78 and Glona v. American Guarantee 
& Liability Insurance Co.74 raised the possibility that the putative 
father-illegitimate child relationship may be entitled to protection 
as a fundamental interest, or, alternatively, that classifications based 
on illegitimacy are, like racial classifications, inherently suspect. Both 
cases involved statutory classifications based on a child's legitimacy. 
In Levy, five illegitimate children were precluded from suing for 
their mother's wrongful death solely because of their illegitimacy. 
The Supreme Court held that the statutory denial of wrongful death 
benefits to these illegitimate children for the death of their mother 
violated the equal protection clause.75 The grounds for the decision, 
however, were unclear.76. Some of the Court's language stressed that 
there was no rational relationship between the classification and some 
legitimate state purpose.77 However, the decision might have sug-
gested that illegitimacy was a suspect classification,78 invoking a 
discriminate against the illegitimate child and those that discriminate against the 
putative father will be ignored. Strictly speaking, both sets of laws classify on the 
legitimacy of the child. However, it can be maintained that only classifications that 
discriminate directly against the child should be suspect. After all, the father, unlike 
the child, has some control in determining the status of the child, Only for the child 
does legitimacy become a factor, like race, over which the individual has no control. 
This problem might be overcome by maintaining that the child will be harmed if he 
is denied the company of a fit father and that the child cannot usually claim this right, 
Therefore, the father should have standing to raise a claim of the child's rights. 
Cf, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In light of the conclusion that illegitimacy 
is not a suspect classification, see text accompanying notes 85·96 infra, this problem is 
moot. 
73. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
74. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
75. 391 U.S. at 72. 
76. See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note I, at 2•14 (1969). 
77. "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the line 
drawn is a rational one." 391 U.S. at 71. 
78. "We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them when no action, 
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stricter scrutiny of the classification by the Court. In addition, the 
Court stated: 
[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights 
. . . and have not hestitated to strike down an invidious classifica-
tion even though it had history and tradition on its side .... The 
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship be-
tween a child and his own mother.79 · 
Thus, the decision may also be read broadly to suggest that the 
"familial relationship" betw·een mother and child is a fundamental 
interest. By analogy, the relationship between the putative father and 
his child may also be fundamental. 
In Glona, the companion case to Levy, a mother was precluded 
by statute from suing for her illegitimate son's ·wrongful death. Again 
the Court held that the statutory classification, discriminating this 
time against the mother of the illegitimate child, violated the equal 
protection clause.80 However, in Glona, the Court's language sug-
gests unambiguously that the statutory classification was irrational 
under the traditional equal protection standard.81 If the Court in-
tended to hold in Levy that the relationship between mother and 
illegitimate child is fundamental, or that illegitimacy is a suspect 
classification, it could have decided Glona more easily by applying 
the compelling state interest standard to invalidate the state wrong-
ful death statute that was hostile to the relationship bet1veen the 
mother and her illegitimate children. Unlike the case in Levy, the 
sanction in Glona applied directly to the "sinning" mother rather 
than against the innocent child. Thus, the relationship between the 
asserted purpose to deter illegitimacy and the classification denying 
wrongful death benefits seems somewhat more rational than that in 
Levy. 82 Indeed, when one considers some of the classifications based 
on tenuous grounds that have been upheld by the Court before and 
since Glona,88 the result reached by the Court is a bit puzzling. It 
might have appeared that the Court's ostensible application of the 
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the 
mother." 391 U.S. at 72. 
79. 391 U.S. at 71. 
80. 391 U.S. at 75-76. 
81. "Yet we see no possible rational basis .•. for assuming that if the natural 
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause 
of illegitimacy will be served." 391 U.S. at 75. 
82. Cf. 391 U.S. at 76-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued, inter alia, 
that it is logical for the state to enforce its requirements of marriage by declaring that 
certain rights are dependent upon formal family relationships. Whatever the efficacy 
of this argument in Levy, where the child had no control over its parents' activities, it 
certainly is stronger as applied in Glona to the mother of the child. See H. KRAusE, 
supra note 6, at 67. 
83. See cases cited in note 31 supra. 
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rationality test in Glona, as well as its ambiguous language in Levy, 
was an initial step toward holding that illegitimacy was a suspect 
classification or that the relationship between parent and illegitimate 
child was fundamental.84 
Whatever those two decisions meant, they were limited by the 
Court's five-to-four decision in Labine v. Vincent.86 In that case the 
father of an illegitimate girl, who had lived with him, died intestate. 
Because he had acknowledged her as his daughter, she could have 
been a legatee in his will under Louisiana law, but not his heir.so 
In contrast, a legitimate child was not only an heir, but could not 
even be disinherited by a will.87 In an opinion with remarkably little 
discussion about equal protection the Court, applying at best the 
rational relation test,88 upheld the classification. The Court in this 
case made it clear that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification.so 
Moreover, the Court's summary treatment of the equal protection 
issue suggests that the relationship betwe·en an illegitimate child 
and his father is not fundamental. Labine may have closed the door 
to several of the possible routes to invocation of the compelling in-
terest test when laws curtailing the parental rights of putative fathers 
are at issue. 
This conclusion is not changed by the recent decision of Weber 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.00 Under Louisiana law, an unac-
knowledged illegitimate child could not recover under the work-
men's compensation statute for his father's death on the same basis 
as a legitimate child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.91 The 
decedent had four dependent legitimate children and two illegiti-
mate children, whom he could not legally acknowledge. 02 The latter 
children were totally denied a share of the workmen's compensation 
benefits for their father's death. The Supreme Court, relying heavily 
on Levy,98 said that the inquiry in equal protection was a dual one: 
84. Cf. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 14, in which the authors express their 
belief that the Court in Glona took the middle position between the two standards 
of review. 
85. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 200, 202, 206, 919 (West 1952), 
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (West 1952). 
88. See 401 U.S. at 536 n.6: 
Even if we were to apply the "rational basis" test to the Louisiana intestate 
succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's 
interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left 
within the State. 
89. "Levy did not say and cannot fairly be read to say that a State can never treat 
an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring." 401 U.S. at 5!16. 
90. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
91. LA. REv. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1021(3), 1232(4)-(6), 1232(8) (West 1964). 
92. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 204 (West 1952). 
93. Given the similarities in the origins and purposes of [the wrongful death and 
workmen's compensation statutes] ••• it would require a disregard of precedent 
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"What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What 
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?"94 
The Court held that no legitimate state interest justified Louisiana's 
classification scheme,05 but did not discuss whether the state's dis-
crimination against unacknowledged illegitimate children endan-
gered any fundamental personal rights. The Weber Court's 
language does not suggest that it viewed illegitimacy as a suspect 
classification or the father-illegitimate child relationship as funda-
mental. This reading of the opinion is reinforced by the fact that 
the Court carefully distinguished Labine.96 Weber is best viewed as 
an attempt to reconcile Labine and Levy. The notion that the com-
pelling state interest standard of review may be applied to any 
classification based on illegitimacy or hostile to the relationship be-
tween a father and his illegitimate child remains dubious. 
However, it might be contended more narrowly that those laws 
that curtail the parental privileges of the putative father still deserve 
strict scrutiny. This possibility may not be wholly foreclosed by the 
Court's decisions discussed above. Significantly, in Levy, Labine, and 
Weber the Court dealt, respectively, with laws that barred the illegit-
imate child from ·wrongful death benefits, the ability to succeed to 
property as an heir, and workmen's compensation benefits-all after 
the death of the parent. These laws did not directly infringe upon 
or curtail a possibly extant personal relationship between parent and 
illegitimate child. Rather, they merely limited the rights of the 
illegitimate child after the death of his parent in relation to rights 
he would otherwise have had as a legitimate child. Similarly, the 
classification in Glona merely precluded the mother from a cash 
and the principles of stare decisis to hold that Levy did not control the facts of the 
case before us. 
406 U.S. at 172. 
94. 406 U.S. at 173. 
95. 406 U.S. at 176. The Court noted that, as in Glona, it cannot reasonably be 
thought that persons will shun illicit relations because illegitimate children cannot 
receive workmen's compensation benefits. 406 U.S. at 173. The Court also stated that 
the statutory distinctions do not reflect a greater closeness between a father and his 
legitimate children since dependency was a prerequisite to anyone's recovery. 406 U.S. 
173-74. 
96. The first ground for distinction was that Labine reflected a "traditional deference 
to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its 
borders." 406 U.S. at 170. The second distinction was that in Labine the intestate, 
unlike the deceased in the present action, might easily have modified his illegitimate 
daughter's unfavorable position. 406 U.S. at 170-71. In Labine the deceased could have 
written a will leaving property to his daughter who could not be an heir if he died 
intestate. But the deceased in Weber could not acknowledge his children since he could 
not marry their mother, and thus they could not be qualified for protection under 
the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute. It is unclear what the Court would 
have done if decedent could have acknowledged his child, although Justice Blackmun, 
concurring in the result, felt that the Court would have struck down the classification 
anyway. 406 U.S. at 176-77. 
,, 
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benefit after the death of her illegitimate child. Certainly, it is 
another thing for the law to discourage or preclude a personal rela-
tionship between a living father and his illegitimate child. The 
question remains whether this is a constitutionally significant dis-
tinction, providing a stronger ground for application of the com-
pelling interest test in the latter situation. Despite the Court's 
utilization of the traditional equal protection standard when re-
viewing laws that were hostile to the legal relationship between 
father and illegitimate child, is it possible that the putative father's 
interest in a personal relationship with his child might be viewed as 
fundamental? 
The interest most directly affected by the illegitimacy classifica-
tions in the cases discussed above was primarily economic-the de-
nial of some sort of after-death dollar benefit. Viewed in this light, 
the use of the traditional standard of review under the equal pro-
tection clause is not surprising.117 The putative father's interest in 
custody, visitation rights, or notice and an opportunity to be heard 
at adoption proceedings is noneconomic; it is an intimate, personal 
interest, arguably deserving greater judicial protection. 
Recently in Stanley v. Illinois 98 the Supreme Court was squarely 
confronted with a case involving the parental rights of the putative 
father of an illegitimate child. Avoiding a clarification of the issue 
whether the putative father has a fundamental interest in main-
taining a personal relationship with his illegitimate child, the Court 
decided the case essentially upon due process grounds.00 Since the 
Court's due process rationale has potentially far-reaching implica-
tions regarding the parental rights of the putative father, it is given 
independent consideration below.100 However, in finding the father's 
claims to be cognizable and substantial under the due process clause 
the Court commented: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has 
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a power-
ful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest 
of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for 
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely 
from shifting economic arrangements."101 
The Court in Stanley seemed to feel that the relationship between 
97. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family 
Sec. Life Ins, Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). 
98. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
99. 405 U.S. at 658. 
100. See text accompanying notes 132-78 infra. 
101. 405 U.S. at 651, quoting Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
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the petitioner, a putative father, and his child was as important as 
that between a parent and a legitimate child. Indeed, the Court 
expressly noted that "the law [has not] refused to recognize those 
family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."102 
Read broadly, the language in Stanley supports the contention 
that the personal relationship between any father and child is funda-
mental. But in its context the quoted language may have only meant 
that the putative father's interests are protected by the requirements 
of procedural due process. Stanley's primary reliance on a due pro-
cess rationale, rather than an equal protection one, may suggest that 
infringement upon the father's interest will not invoke the com-
pelling state interest test. 
The chronology of Levy-Labine-Weber seems clearly to pro-
nounce the end of any possibility of illegitimacy classifications being 
held suspect. These cases also may have foreclosed the possibility 
of the father-child relationship being held fundamental. After all, 
the Court itself raised the possibility in Levy only seemingly to fore-
close it in Labine. While the distinction between a legal and a per-
sonal relationship has some appeal, it is unlikely that the Court will 
declare a personal relationship between a putative father and his 
child to be fundamental. In recent equal protection cases, the Court 
has refused to declare fundamental two personal interests of equal 
or greater importance, sustenance1°3 and housing.104 Thus, one seek-
ing to challenge current laws would be well advised to concentrate 
his arguments elsewhere. 
3. Sex as a New Suspect Classification? 
The Impact of Reed v. Reed 
The laws governing the parental privileges of custody, visitation, 
and notice and an opportunity to be heard at adoption proceedings 
clearly discriminate against the father of an illegitimate child as con-
trasted with the mother of the same child. Thus, these laws are quite 
properly viewed as creating sexual classifications. 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has not regarded sex as a 
suspect classification.105 However, recently in Reed v. Reed106 the 
102. 405 U.S. at 651. 
103. Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970). 
104. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). 
105. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 
(1872). · 
However, the California supreme court has recently held sex to be a suspe~t classifi-
cation. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). 
Several other cases have struck down classifications based on sex. Seidenberg v. 
McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp.· 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); White v. Crook, 251 
F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 
(1968). Cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield eounty School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971); 
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Court struck down an Idaho law that discriminated against women. 
In order to resolve controversies over the appointment of estate 
administrators, the Idaho law provided for a series of statutory pref-
erences based on the relation of the petitioner to the decedent. 
Within each class of relations men were to be preferred over 
women.107 In Reed the separated parents of a deceased minor 
petitioned independently for appointment to administer his estate. 
Since, as parents, both were in the same class of relatives, the 
statutory preference favoring the male required that the father be 
appointed administrator. The mother's claim that this treatment 
violated the equal protection clause was rejected by the Idaho su-
preme court108 but sustained by a unanimous Supreme Court of the 
United States.109 
The Idaho court supplied two grounds for upholding the ad-
ministrator preference law. The first ground was that the statute 
was not designed to discriminate against women but to reduce 
controversies over who should be appointed administrator, which 
would othenvise require a hearing on the merits.110 To this end, 
some order of preference among various classes was necessary. Under 
the statute, not only were men preferred over women, but children 
were preferred over parents, parents over brothers and sisters, and 
so on. If the preference of child over parent is valid, why not that 
of men over women? Apparently, the court believed that the state 
could quite properly resolve these controversies by a set of mechan-
ical rules. The second ground was that the legislature evidently 
concluded that men are, on the whole, better qualified to administer 
estates.111 The court noted that this generalization is not true in 
every case, but was not prepared to say that it was "so completely 
without a basis in fact as to be irrational and arbitrary."112 A third 
Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 
1970). Contra, Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
393 U.S. 982 (1968); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, mem., 
401 U.S. 951 (1971): Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 m. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 1173 
(1969); State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 S.2d 891 (1970), revd. on other grounds 
sub nom. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). Cf. La Fleur v. Cleveland Dd. 
of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See generally Johnston &: Knapp, Sex 
Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Prospective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV, 675 (1971). 
106. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
107. [1943] Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 162, § I; Probate Practice Act of 1864, § 53, Idaho 
Territory. The Idaho probate law involved in Reed was formerly codified at IDAHO 
CODE §§ 15-312,-314 (1948). These laws were repealed effective July I, 1972, as Idaho 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code. See [1971] Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 111. 
108. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970). 
109. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
110. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 6!!8. 
111. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 688. 
112. 93 Idaho at 514, 465 P.2d at 638. 
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rationale for the Idaho administrator preference scheme, noted in the 
Supreme Court opinion, was that such a law may prevent intrafamily 
squabbles over who shall be appointed administrator.113 To fulfill 
this purpose, the Idaho legislature had to prefer one relation over 
another, one sex over the other. This is essentially another "mechan-
ical rule" argument. 
In reversing the Idaho court's judgment, the Supreme Court did 
not say that sex was a suspect classification. Rather, the Court pur-
ported to apply the rational relation test.114 The purposes of re-
ducing the workload of the probate courts and promoting family 
harmony were found to be permissible state purposes;115 but the 
means chosen, the mandatory preference based on sex, was deemed 
an "arbitrary legislative choice."116 Noting that those within the same 
class of relatives were similarly. situated, the Court held that it was 
a violation of equal protection. to favor one sex over the other within 
each class.117 The Court did not squarely note the argument, relied 
upon by the Idaho court, that men are generally better estate ad-
ministrators than women. It did, however, disparage this argument 
obliquely, noting that under the statutory scheme "a woman whose 
spouse dies intestate has a preference over a son, father, brother, or 
any other male relative of the decedent."118 Moreover, the Court 
took judicial notice that a larg~ proportion of estates are adminis-
tered by surviving widows.119 
The Court in Reed failed to mention or cite earlier cases that 
had upheld sexual classifications. These cases had looked for, at 
best, a minimal rational relation between classification and purpose. 
Goesaert v. Cleary,120 for example, upheld a Michigan law that pro-
hibited women from tending bar unless they were the wife or daugh-
ter of the bar's male mvner. The Court ignored the statute's most 
obvious legislative purpose-monopolization of the trade for males-
and found a purpose in protecting women from social vices. Because 
of this, "Michigan could, beyond qu~stion, forbid all women .from 
working behind a bar.''121 An exception for wives and daughters of 
male tavernkeepers was deemed reasonable since the presence of a 
male family member would tend to reduce danger to. a barmaid. 
The Court made clear its view that sex was not an impermissible 
classification: "The fact that women may now have achieved the 
113. 404 U.S. at 76-77. 
114. 404 U.S. at 76. 
115. 404 U.S. at 76-77. 
116. 404 U.S. at 76. 
117. 404 U.S. at 77. 
118. 404 U.S. at 75. 
119. 404 U.S. at 75. 
120. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
121. 335 U.S. at 465. 
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virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now 
indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the 
States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes .. , ."122 
In Hoyt v. Florida,123 the Court upheld Florida's automatic ex-
emption from jury service for women. Since women who desired to 
become jurors were required to register, there were few female jurors. 
The Court concluded that a state could reasonably believe that since 
a woman is still the center of the home life, she should automatically 
be relieved of jury duty unless she felt such duty was consistent with 
her responsibilities.124 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, added: 
This case in no way resembles those involving race or color in 
which the circumstances shown were found by this Court to compel 
a conclusion of purposeful discriminatory exclusions from jury ser-
vice .... There is present here neither the unfortunate atmosphere 
of ethnic or-racial prejudices which underlay the situations depicted 
in those cases nor the long course of discriminatory administrative 
practice which the statistical showing in each of them evinced.121l 
Thus, the Court did not consider sexual classifications to be in• 
herently suspect, as were racial classifications. 
The judicial attitude toward the sexual classifications in Reed 
may represent a departure from the attitude evidenced in Goesaert 
and Hoyt. The Court may be beginning to look at sexual classifica-
tions more seriously. There are several indications that the Court 
would have upheld those classifications in Reed that favored one set 
of relatives over another without favoring one sex over another.126 
Yet, if the vice of the sexual classification was that the mechanical 
rules saved court time "arbitrarily" by favoring males over females 
without determining the best administrator, then the rules favoring 
some relatives ove~ others would be equally arbitrary. It could be 
argued that the children of the deceased are generally closer to the 
deceased than his parents and hence are better administrators of the 
estate. But is it any less conceivable that, all other factors being 
equal, men are better qualified, if only from practical business ex-
perience, as administrators? If no tenable distinction exists between 
the rationality of sexual classifications as compared with lineal rela-
122. 335 U.S. at 466. 
123. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
124. 368 U.S. at 61-62. 
125. 368 U.S. at 68, citing Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. 
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 
128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
126. The Court continually stressed the arbitrary nature of the mandatory sex 
classification. See 404 U.S. at 74, 76, 77. Indeed, the Court hinted that only one other 
part of the Idaho statutory scheme was invalid-the section that favored brothers over 
sisters. 404 U.S. at 74-75 n.4. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the favoritism 
given males over females was not redeemed by the fact that it was part of a broader 
scheme, thus implying that the favoritism given some relatives was valid. 404 U.S. at 77. 
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tionship classifications in regard to the purpose of obtaining the best 
administrator, then one may infer that the Court may have regarded 
sex as a special criterion for classification. While the Court will up-
hold arbitrary mechanital rules favoring one class of relatives over 
another in order to decrease the workload of the probate courts and 
to promote intrafamily harmony, it will not uphold a mechanical 
rule favoring one sex over the other. Thus, although the Court 
ostensibly employed the rationality test, it is arguable that it was in 
fact applying a stricter standard of review to the sexual classifications. 
However, the argument that because the Court employed a 
stricter standard of review in Reed, sex is now a suspect classification, 
would probably fail in the face of the Court's explicit "rationality" 
language. Reed v. Reed is a Janus-like decision. It might be viewed 
as a cautious first step in a line of precedent that will conclude with 
the express recognition of sex as a suspect classification.127 But the 
decision will probably be read narrowly as a rather unique case that 
struck down a peculiar statute under the traditional equal protection 
standard, and the potentially broader implications of the decision 
may be ignored. 
Two recent Supreme Court summary affirmances of lower federal 
court decisions suggest that the latter reading of Reed is the more 
likely. In Williams v. McNair128 the Court upheld a state university's 
exclusion of males on the ground that all-male and coeducational 
state schools of similar quality were available. Forbush v. Wallace129 
upheld a regulation requiring that a married woman use her hus-
band's surname on a driver's license application. Although both of 
these cases involved difficult problems of the extent to which the 
equal protection clause invalidates sexual classifications, the Court's 
disposition of them manifested a reluctance to proceed, if proceed 
at all, at anything more than a deliberate pace. Indeed, the cases 
cast serious doubt on the proposition that sex is a suspect classifica-
tion. 
Two cases decided in the spring of 1972 might have clarified this 
area but did not do so. In Alexander v. Louisiana,130 the Court 
127. One technique of overruling prior decisions is first to set up a line of contrary 
decisions so that the Court can later say that the prior decisions have been drained 
of all vitality. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright, The "ATt" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 211, 223-26. 
Commentators have discussed the implications and the desirability of treating sex 
as a suspect classification. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We 
Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L REY. 1499 (1971); Comment, Are 
Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 481 (1971). Cf. 
Brown, Emerson, Falk &: Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional 
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
128. 401 U.S. 951 (1971), afjg. mem. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970). 
129. 405 U.S. 970 (1972), afjg. mem. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971) •. 
130. 405 U.S. 625 (1972). 
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avoided the issue of whether equal protection prohibits exclusion of 
women from grand juries and instead decided the case on the ground 
that the state had unconstitutionally excluded blacks from grand 
juries. More significantly, in Stanley v. Illinois the Court avoided a 
clarification of the sexual classification issue as well as the funda-
mental interest issue.131 Thus, the proposition that classifications dis-
favoring the putative father are suspect classifications based upon 
sex, as well as the proposition that the putative father has a funda-
mental interest in maintaining or developing a personal relationship 
with his illegitimate child, remains dubious. Stanley, however, de-
serves a detailed examination since its due process rationale may 
provide a touchstone for future litigation concerning the parental 
rights of the putative father. 
III. THE SURPRISING EMERGENCE OF DUE PROCESS 
A. Stanley v. Illinois 
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act132 has special provisions estab-
lishing procedures for the care of dependent children. The statutory 
definition of "dependent child" includes those minor children who 
are living without a "parent" or court-appointed guardian.183 Sig-
nificantly, the definition of "parent" includes the mother, but not 
the father, of an illegitimate child.134 In Stanley an unmarried man 
and woman lived together intermittently for eighteen years, during 
which time they had three children.186 After the mother died, the 
state instituted proceedings to have the two youngest children ad-
judicated dependent. The trial court concluded that since the chil-
dren's father had never married their mother, the father was not a 
"parent" under the statutory scheme. Thus, the children were "de-
pendent," and became wards of the court upon their mother's death. 
Consequently, the court granted the state's request for appointment 
of two neighbors as guardians.186 The father's claim that the Illinois 
statute's discrimination between mother and father violated the 
equal protection clause was rejected on appeal by the Illinois su-
preme court, which held that the classification was rational, given 
the purposes of the Act.137 
The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois judgment, holding that 
the statutory procedure violated both the due process and equal pro-
131. See text accompanying notes 98·100 supra. 
132, ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1971 8: Supp. 1972). 
133. ILL. R.Ev. STAT, ch, 37, § 702-5 (1971). 
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1971), 
135. 405 U.S. at 646. 
136. See Brief for Petitioner at 4•6, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), 
137. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970). 
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tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.188 The Court's equal 
protection holding was deduced from and dependent upon its due 
process holding, as the following passage indicates: 
We have concluded that [under the Due Process Clause] all Illinois 
parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness be-
fore their children are removed from their custody. It follows that 
denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting 
it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.1so 
Thus, it is the due process holding on which the decision turned.140 
In considering the Illinois procedure under the due process 
clause, the Court observed that it was "firmly established that 'what 
procedures due process may require under any given set of circum-
stances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the 
government function involved as well as the private interest that has 
been affected by governmental action.' "141 Stressing the strong "pri-
vate interest ... of a man in the children he has sired and raised"142 
and drawing no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate fam-
ily relationships,148 the Court noted that "Stanley's interest in re-
taining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial.''144 
The Court did not question Illinois' statutory purpose, but only 
the means used by the state in order to achieve its objective. The 
Court observed that the stated purpose
1
of the Juvenile Court Act is 
to protect "the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the 
minor and the best interests of the community" and to "strengthen 
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the 
custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protec-
tion of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without re-
moval ... .''141i 
Given this purpose, the Court observed that 
138. 405 U.S. at 649. 
139. 405 U.S. at 658. In reply, Chief Justice Burger in dissent said, "This 'method 
of analysis' is, of course, no more or less than the use of the Equal Protection Clause 
as a shorthand condensation of the entire Constitution .••• " 405 U.S. at 660. 
140. The due process rationale was surprising since it had not been argued in any 
court. See Brief for Petitioner, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Chief Justice 
Burger noted that, under precedent, this was exceeding the Court's jurisdiction. 405 
U.S. at 659-60 (dissenting opinion). The Court replied by pointing to its feeble equal 
protection holding and saying, "(w]e dispose of the case on the constitutional premise 
raised below, reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state 
court." 405 U.S. at 658 n.10. 
141. 405 U.S. at 650, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961). 
142. 405 U.S. at 651. 
143. 405 U.S. at 651·52. 
144. 405 U.S. at 652. 
145. 405 U.S. at 652, quoting ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1971). 
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the State registers no gain toward its declared goals when it separates 
children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit 
father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly 
separates him from his family.146 
From this reasoning, and relying on Bell v. Burson141 and Car-
rington v. Rash,148 the Court held that Illinois must give the putative 
father a hearing on his fitness before depriving him of his children. 
Administrative convenience could not justify the state's failure to 
provide such a hearing.149 The Court stated: 
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than in-
dividualized interpretation. But when, as here, the procedure fore-
closes the determinative issues of competence and care, when it ex-
plicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it 
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of 
both parent and child.150 
The curious aspect of this decision was that in the guise of pro-
cedural due process, the Court struck down Illinois' substantive law. 
The father in Stanley in fact had been granted a hearing. What the 
Court objected to was that the only issue in the father's hearing was 
whether he had ever married his children's mother. The Court 
dictated to Illinois the substance of the putative father's hearing 
when it insisted that the state inquire into his fitness before removing 
his children. Conceding that the difference between substance and 
procedure is unclear in many contexts,11i1 the result in Stanley ap-
pears clearly substantive. 
Since the judicial crisis of the 1930's, the Court, when reviewing 
statutes under the due process clause, has been very reluctant to 
strike down substantive rules but quite willing to require that states 
adopt certain procedural safeguards.162 The two cases relied upon by 
the Court in Stanley do not provide a solid foundation for the ap-
parent mixing of these two concepts. 
Bell v. Burson involved a Georgia administrative system in which 
the driver's license of an uninsured motorist was suspended when the 
motorist became involved in an accident, unless the motorist could 
post sufficient security to meet possible claims.168 The Supreme Court 
146. 405 U.S. at 652-53. 
147. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
148. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
149. 405 U.S. at 656-57. 
150. 405 U.S. at 657. 
151. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
152. Compare Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), with 
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). 
153. GA. CooE ANN. § 92A-605 (Supp. 1972). 
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held that a hearing on a driver's probable liability for any claims 
arising out of the accident was mandatory before his license could 
be suspended.154 Bell is distinguishable from Stanley since in Bell 
there would have eventually been a hearing to determine the driver's 
liability in the accident and a finding that the driver was without 
liability would have lifted his suspension at that time.155 Indeed, the 
Court made this ppint in rejecting Georgia's argument "that it need 
not provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are 
irrelevant to the statutory scheme."156 Thus, Bell is a classic example 
of the judicial imposition of a procedural safeguard that does not 
contradict the state's substantive scheme. In Stanley, on the other 
hand, Illinois never required a later hearing on the father's parental 
fitness; his fitness in the particular case was irrelevant to the sub-
stantive scheme. 
The other case relied on by the Court, Carrington v. Rash, .in-
volved an equal protection challenge to a Texas law creating an 
irrebuttable presumption that servicemen were not bona fide resi-
dents and hence precluding them from voting. Carrington involved 
access to the ballot, clearly a fundamental interest.157 The Court in 
that case demanded that more precise classifications be employed to 
determine which servicemen were bona fide residents of the state. 
Imprecision of classification is a problem in Stanley-a child's wel-
fare may be diminished if he is taken away from a fit putative father. 
But the Court in Stanley did not deal with this problem under the 
equal protection clause; rather, it held that a hearing on the putative 
father's fitness was a requisite of due process. Thus, the Court's 
application of Carrington's imprecise classification rationale to the 
statute involved in Stanley was an unusual use of precedent. 
B. The Application of Stanley v. Illinois to Other 
Discriminations Against the Putative Father 
The effect of Stanley on other discriminations against the putative 
father is unclear. As Chief Justice Burger said in his dissent, the 
decision "embarks on a novel concept of the natural law for unwed 
fathers that could well have strange boundaries as yet undiscem-
ible."rns Because the Court used the language of procedural due 
154. 402 U.S. at 542-43. 
155. GA. ConE ANN. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1972). 
156. 402 U.S. at 541. 
157. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1972). The opinion in Carrington 
itself is unclear. The Court first states that there must be a reasonable relation between 
the classification and its purpose, 380 U.S. at 93, and then later states that the right 
to vote is close "to the core of our constitutional system" and may not be casually 
denied, 380 U.S. at 96. Despite this ambiguity, Carrington has been recognized as 
applying a more stringent equal protection test. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
660 &: n.8 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
158. 405 U.S. at 668. 
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process, Stanley should be solid precedent in that area. But since its 
holding affected state substantive law, Stanley may also have sub-
stantive implications. 
I. Procedural Effects of Stanley 
As discussed above,159 most states deny the putative father notice 
of a pending adoption. Notice and a right to be heard are traditional 
requirements of procedural due process.160 In holding that the puta-
tive father's interest in his child is "cognizable" under the due pro-
cess clause,161 Stanley raises the issue whether these requirements of 
due process apply to the putative father's interest in his child's adop-
tion.162 It might be contended that due process only protects the 
interest of a "man in the children he has sired and raised,"163 not 
that of a father who has never seen or who rarely sees his child. 
This argument, however, is totally impractical because such a limita-
tion would require an investigation in every case to determine the 
extent of the putative father's relationship with the child prior to 
the adoption,164 and such investigations would not be without bor-
derline situations of interpretive difficulty. Therefore, it seems far 
simpler and the only reasonable reading of Stanley to hold that the 
blood relationship between father and child is in itself a substantial 
interest protected by due process. 
In order to evaluate the procedural due process claim that notice 
and a hearing must be given the putative father, one must consider 
not only the interests of the father, but also those of the state.10u 
Because the father may provide suggestions concerning the child's 
future that would not otherwise be considered, the state cannot argue 
that denying the putative father notice and an opportunity to be 
heard would necessarily further the child's interests.166 It is especially 
important that the father be given some hearing within a short time 
after the child is surrendered for adoption so that any custody issues 
are resolved before the child becomes attached to one guardian.167 
The contention that such a procedural requirement would upset 
159. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra. 
160. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), 
161. 405 U.S. at 652. 
162. In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Court held that due process 
requires notice to the father of a legitimate child before adoption. 
163. 405 U.S. at 651. 
164. Cf. Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice, 
1968 U. Iu.. L.F. 232, 236-37. 
165. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971): Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 262-66 (1970). 
166. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard, 50 M1NN, 
L. REv. 1071, 1084 (1966). 
167. See id. at 1080, 1085. 
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adoption proceedings and create uncertainty is dubious. Only rea• 
sonable efforts to notify the father are necessary; if he cannot be 
located, the adoption may still proceed.168 The increased costs of 
serving process would not justify the failure to give notice since 
relatively inexpensive means, such as the mail, could be used.169 
Because there is no apparent substantial countervailing state interest, 
notice to the putative father and an opportunity to be heard at adop• 
tion proceedings should be required by the due process clause.17° 
The father should be heard, if he so desires, at the parental termina• 
tion hearing.171 If no parental termination hearing is required by 
state law, he should be allowed to bring an independent custody 
proceeding within a reasonable time.172 Only such procedures can 
ensure that an interested parent's suggestions for his child's future 
will at least be considered before the adoption becomes final. 
2. Substantive Effects of Stanley 
While the impact of Stanley on procedural due process issues is 
fairly clear, its effect on substantive discriminations is uncertain. If 
Stanley presages strict scrutiny of the substantive laws that dis-
criminate against the putative father, its effect could be devastating. 
Unless held to its facts, Stanley would vitiate the current state laws 
that automatically favor the mother, if she is a fit parent, in custody 
disputes with the putative father.173 In this situation it might 
168. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950). 
169. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-19. 
170. Contra, Thomas v. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961); 
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 
(1972). 
One aggravating problem is finding an appropriate remedy for a failure to give 
notice to the father. To give the father custody after the child had spent some time 
with the adoptive parents would vindicate the father's rights but also would likely 
harm the child. The Court in vacating the judgment in Rothstein for consideration in 
light of Stanley recognized this, for it ordered due consideration be given "for the com-
pletion of the adoption proceeding and the fact that the child has apparently lived 
with the adoptive parents for the intervening period of time." 405 U.S. at 1051. One 
student commentator has argued that this lack of an effective remedy vitiates the right. 
Note, 1971 WIS. L. REv. 1262, supra note 3, at 1270-73. This ignores the fact that usually 
the Court has created remedies when needed to vindicate a recognized right. See, e.g., 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A possible alternative remedy is to give the father 
a cause of action against the adoption agency that allowed adoption without attempt-
ing to give the father notice. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). In any case, it is likely that responsible agencies, not wanting to risk a change in 
custody after placement, would attempt to give the father notice. See Comment, supra 
note 164, at 237. 
171. Cf. In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731 (1963), decided on merits, 269 
Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964). 
172. Cf. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan, 270 
Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). 
173. See authorities cited in notes 8-9 supra. 
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be said that the state is still proceeding by presumption contrary to 
the spirit of Stanley. The Court noted in Stanley that while many 
putative fathers may be unsuitable parents, "some are wholly suited 
to have custody of their children."174 Similarly, some putative fathers 
will provide a better environment and have a better relationship 
with the child than its mother, although she too is a fit parent. This 
result may be desirable in terms of policy; but if the focus is upon 
the state's failure to further the child's welfare in every case, then 
all of the laws that discriminate against the putative father share this 
defect.176 For this reason, courts might be reluctant to extend Stanley 
at all for fear that, absent a stopping point, all of these laws would 
be invalid. 
There is at least one tenable argument to limit Stanley to its 
facts. In Stanley the state on its own initiative intervened into a 
family's life and took the child away from the father. Suits between 
private individuals are probably a more common method of de-
termining child custody than dependency actions initiated by govern-
ment.176 It might be contended that Stanley only requires a hearing 
on the father's fitness when the state intervenes to take custody away 
from the father; the courts may still irrebuttably presume that the 
father is unfit, or less fit, when there is a custody dispute between 
private individuals. This limitation would reconcile the result in 
Stanley with its procedural due process language: when a state takes 
custody of a child or something else of importance from an in-
dividual, it must hold a hearing to ensure that it is furthering its 
announced goals. This "procedural" limitation of Stanley's value as 
precedent, however, ignores the substantive impact the case had on 
Illinois' Juvenile Court Act. Apparently no other procedural due 
process case has required that a state determine certain issues in its 
hearings; prior cases required only that, given the substantive law, 
states grant individuals notice and a hearing.177 Although one cannot 
be sure what course the courts will take,178 procedural limitation of 
Stanley appears to be a likely result. Given the apparent reluctance 
of the Supreme Court to extend the reach of constitutional adjudica-
174. 405 U.S. at 654. 
175. See text accompanying notes 49-59 supra. 
176. Among the most common procedural devices in private custody disputes is the 
writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the writ used in criminal cases, the welfare of the child 
rather than the legal right to custody is the ultimate issue. See, e.g., New York Found• 
ling Hospital v. Gatt., 203 U.S. 429 (1906); Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid So• 
ciety v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949). Other procedural mechanisms include 
petitions in equity and petitions for guardianship. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 
5, § 17.3. 
177. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Schroeder v, City 
of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). 
178. We shall soon learn what one state court thinks of this problem. See Vanderlaan 
v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding for consideration in light 
of Stanley v, Illinois 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970). 
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tion in this area, the Court is not likely to force states to change their 
current laws without some outside impetus. The political process, 
however, may be providing this impetus in the form of a constitu-
tional amendment. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED 
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
While the decisions discussed above were being argued, con-
sidered, and decided, Congress was deliberating and passing a pro-
posed amendment to the Constitution that would provide for 
equality of rights between men and women.179 If this amendment is 
ratified by the required three fourths of the states,180 the issues 
raised by the cases will be rendered moot since the amendment will 
mandate the far-reaching changes only tenuously suggested by the 
case law. 
With deceptive simplicity the operative provision of the proposed 
amendment provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of sex."181 Although the ru;nbiguity of this provision has been ex-
tensively criticized,182 for present purposes only two issues need be 
discussed: (1) Does the amendment prohibit discrimination that 
favors women over men; and (2) what is the proper standard for 
judicial review under the amendment? . 
The first issue can be resolved readily by reference to the amend-
ment's legislative history, which indicates that the amendment was 
intended to grant complete equality between the sexes. Both houses 
of Congress defeated amendments that would have exempted women 
from the draft.183 Specifically in regard to child custody one House 
supporter of the amendment stated: 
[T]he amendment would eliminate any legal presumption favoring 
the granting of custody to the mother. As a result, child custody cases 
would have to be determined by the courts in terms of the needs and 
best interests of each individual child.184 
179. The proposed amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), passed 
the House on Oct. 12, 1971. 117 CONG. REc. H.9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). Reed was 
decided on November 22, 1971. 404 U.S. at 71. The amendment passed the Senate on 
March 22, 1972. 118 CONG. REc. S.4612 (daily ed. March 22, 1972). Stanley was decided on 
April 3, 1972. 405 U.S. at 645. 
1 
180. At least twenty states of the required thirty-eight have ratified the amendment, 
30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1529 (1972). 
181. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1971). 
182. See, e.g., Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment ls Not the Way, 6 HARV. 
CIV. R.IGHTS·CIV. Lm. L. REv. 234 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some 
Problems of Construction, id. at 243. 
183. 118 CONG. REc. S.4394 (daily ed. March 21, 1972); 117 CoNG. REc. H.9390 {daily 
ed. Oct. 12, 1971). 
184. 117 CONG. REc. H.9247 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative 
Edwards). 
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The legislative history in the Senate also supports the conclusion that 
domestic relations laws favoring women would be void.186 The Senate 
Report stated the basic principle of the amendment: "[S]ex should 
not be a factor in determining the legal rights of men or of 
women."186 Thus, the amendment will protect men as well as women. 
The second issue, the appropriate level of judicial review of 
statutes that classify by sex, cannot, but need not, be answered 
definitively. One thing is certain-Congress did not intend that 
sexual classifications should be upheld on the basis of a mere rational 
relation between the classification and some state objective. A Judi-
ciary Committee amendment that would have upheld sex classifica-
tions that "reasonably promote the health and safety of the people"187 
was defeated on the floor of the House. The Senate Report, adopting 
the minority statement of the House Report, stated generally: 
The legal principle underlying the [proposed amendment] is that 
the law must deal with the individual attributes of the particular 
person and not with stereotypes of over-classification based on sex. 
However,· [the amendment] does not require that women must be 
treated in all respects the same as men. "Equality" does not mean 
"sameness." As a result, the [amendment] would not prohibit reason-
able classifications based on characteristics that are unique to one sex. 
For examble, [sic] a law providing for payment of the medical costs 
of child bearing could only apply to women. In contrast, if a par-
ticular characteristic is found among members of both sexes, then 
under the proposed amendment it is not the sex factor but the in-
dividual factor which should be determinative.1ss 
The laws disfavoring the putative father's parental rights are not 
based on characteristics unique to one sex or the other, for good 
parents can be found among both sexes. Thus, these laws will prob-
ably be in violation of the Constitution upon ratification of the pro-
posed amendment. Read literally, the Senate Report would bar 
blanket discrimination against the putative father no matter how 
compelling the interest supporting the classification. Indeed, an in-
fluential article saw this as an advantage to the amendment.180 
However, it is possible that, by judicial interpretation, a mini-
mum standard of review under the amendment might be to scrutinize 
sexual classifications under a standard, derived from existing case 
185. 118 CONG. REc. S.4389 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Dayh): 
S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1972). 
186. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 2. 
187. 117 CONG. R.Ec. H.9390 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971). See also H.R. REP. No, 92-859, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess (1971). 
188. S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 12, quoting H.R. REP. No, 92-359, supra 
note 187, at 7. 
189. :i:Jrown, ll:mCTSon, Falk & Freecunap, supra note 127, at 880-811 889-90, 
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law, that would incorporate the compelling state interest test.190 This 
difference is more theoretical than real, for, as illustrated above, the 
laws disfavoring the putative father cannot withstand the strict scru-
tiny of the compelling interest test.191 
V. CONCLUSION 
A range of constitutional doctrines and cases potentially affect 
the laws governing the parental rights of the putative father. But 
the most important cases, Reed v. Reed and Stanley v. Illinois, are 
ambiguous. Absent a ratification of the proposed equal rights amend-
ment, a narrow reading of these cases is likely. The Court would 
naturally be reluctant to strike down many sexual classifications fol-
lowing a defeat of the proposed amendment, and the Court would 
have little incentive to extend Stanley beyond procedural due pro-
cess. 
However, all doubts raised by the cases and all current laws that 
discriminate against the putative father would be swept away if the 
proposed constitutional amendment is ratified by the states. Con-
sequently, the putative father would be able to gain custody of his 
child when he is the best available guardian, gain the right to visit 
his child in suitable circumstances, and would have an equal voice 
when adoption is considered for his child. 
These changes will come more from the logic of legal arguments 
than from any outpouring of public sympathy for the plight of the 
putative father. But to focus only upon the legal gains of the putative 
father is to miss the crux of the social problem involved. The primary 
public concern should be for the welfare of the illegitimate child. 
Current laws with their wooden preferences for the mother are sim-
ply not promoting this interest in every case. A forced change in 
current laws may not significantly affect current social relations-the 
mother will probably remain the parent closest to the illegitimate 
child. These changes will, however, require courts to engage in the 
difficult task of determining the welfare of the illegitimate child in 
each dispute concerning the child. Only then can the states claim 
that their domestic relations laws promote the best interests of the 
illegitimate child. 
190. See S. REP. No. 92-689, supra note 185, at 12-13, quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-359, 
supra note 187, at 7 (minority statement). 
191. See text accompanying notes 49-69 supra. 
